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The crises that swept through Asia in late 1997 brought Chile’s
economic boom to an abrupt halt. After having grown at an average
rate of 7.3 percent per year in 1984–97, the Chilean economy expanded
by under 3 percent a year thereafter. So what happened? One answer,
often put forward by the authorities, posits significantly worse exter-
nal conditions as the basic explanation. Because Chile is a small open
economy, the demand for Chilean exports declines when the world
economy slows, leading to lower export prices and volumes. If the price
of oil rises at the same time, this small open economy, which imports
nearly all the oil it consumes, suffers even more. Things worsen fur-
ther if net capital flows to emerging economies suddenly dry up.
Figure 1 plots the basic external variables affecting the Chilean
economy for the period 1980–2001. Panel A shows growth of world gross
domestic product (GDP) using data from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Although there was an economic slowdown in 2001, the
previous few years (particularly 1999 and 2000) were years of high
growth for the world economy as a whole. Panel B shows Chile’s terms
of trade, defined as the price of its exports divided by the price of its
imports, using data from the Central Bank of Chile. A sharp decline
occurred in 2001, but the terms of trade over the previous few years
(1998–2000) were around their average level for the whole period. Net
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private capital flows to emerging markets are shown in panel C. These
have clearly dropped off very sharply, badly hurting economies that
are heavily dependent on external financing. This aspect of the situa-
tion is similar to most of the 1980s. Finally, panel D shows the path of
the international interest rate over the last twenty years.1 This is a
key variable, since it affects the burden of the external debt, as well as
the cost of new borrowing in the case of countries with access to inter-
national capital markets (including Chile). As this panel shows, inter-
est rates stay at their lowest level throughout the period. This variable
is clearly moving in the opposite direction of the other variables men-
tioned, for lower interest rates are positive for a country like Chile.
The external scenario is clearly important for an emerging open
economy like Chile. However, it is difficult to blame all the slowdown in
Chilean economic growth over the last few years on this factor, for three
reasons. First, the deterioration in external conditions came after Chile’s
economic slowdown had already begun. In fact, 1998–2000 was not a bad
period for the world economy, yet Chile grew by under 3 percent per
year.2 Average growth in the world economy for these three years was
above the average for the last two decades. The same can be said about
Chile’s terms of trade: in 1998–2000 they were less than 1 percent below
the average for the last twenty years. Second, although it is true that net
private capital flows to emerging economies declined sharply beginning
in 1996–97 and were almost nonexistent in the last couple of years, it
can be argued that for any given country there is a degree of endogeneity
in this variable. Chilean firms have been able to obtain financing abroad
at relatively low interest rates during this period, and the government
has issued new debt that has been readily accepted on the world capital
market. Chile would thus appear to have access to the international
capital market. Moreover, the most significant feature of the balance of
payments in recent years has been a huge increase in capital outflows,
as Chileans have increased their investments abroad. This could be be-
cause domestic interest rates (adjusted for country risk and expectations
of devaluation) have been relatively low, or simply because there are not
many investment projects in the country at the present time. Third, the
final external variable, the international interest rate, has been quite
favorable in recent years, with both nominal and real rates below their
average for the 1980s and 1990s. The short-term rate has recently fallen
to levels not seen in decades.
1. The 180-day U.S. dollar London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) is used here.
2. The world economy expanded faster in 2000 than at any time since 1988.A. World economic growth
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF).
* Estimated
B. Terms of trade
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
* Estimated
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In short, although external conditions have clearly worsened, this pro-
vides only a partial explanation for the weak performance of the Chilean
economy. Our impression is that the slowdown in economic growth can be
at least partially reversed. This paper argues that the way to do this is by
increasing the growth in total factor productivity (TFP). Chile’s golden
age in terms of economic growth was explained by a strong expansion in
TFP. This, in turn, is explained by the productivity effects of the reforms
implemented in the 1980s and early 1990s, which to some extent have
now been exhausted. Accordingly, what Chile now needs to reinvigorate
economic growth is a new wave of reforms in areas were it has fallen
behind—areas relating mainly to the microeconomic foundations of growth,
namely, institutions and the efficiency and efficacy with which they func-
tion. To put it differently, new microeconomic reforms are needed to en-
hance the efficiency with which available resources are used.
If economic growth is viewed not as a linear process, but rather as
one marked by sporadic productivity shocks that lead to high growth
for a period before fading in convergence until the next productivity
boost, then Chile would currently be in a phase in which the most
recent productivity shock is contributing its last ammunition. If this is
the case, the country needs a new shock to kick-start a new period of
rapid economic growth. This new boost could be a turn of luck, such as
the discovery of oil or a significant positive terms-of-trade shock. Be-
cause luck is random, however, we prefer to consider a new productiv-
ity shock arising from economic policy initiatives aimed at improving
economic efficiency. We argue that improvements in these areas are
likely to produce a new surge in economic growth in Chile. Further-
more, the deterioration in external conditions increases the need for
policies to boost the country’s currently sluggish growth rate.
It could be argued that the slowdown that Chile has faced in the
last years is the natural state of things. Countries cannot grow forever
at 7 percent; at some point they must converge to more normal growth
rates. Although the point is correct, international experience shows
that several countries in Asia, Europe, and even Latin America have
grown at rates in the neighborhood of 7 percent for longer periods of
time—say, twenty, thirty, and even forty years.3 The same evidence
also suggests that it is possible to sustain longer periods of growth in
total factor productivity. Hence, although Chile’s fifteen years of 7 per-
cent growth is a great achievement, the current slowdown should not
be viewed as the natural end of an era.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents some styl-
ized facts on the Chilean economy, beginning with an analysis of the
behavior of total factor productivity over the last several years. Our
conclusion is that the country is currently going through a signifi-
cant productivity slowdown. We then identify several areas that have
significant potential for increasing efficiency through economic re-
form. Finally, the section presents a number of indicators of
microeconomic efficiency for Chile, showing that while the country is
highly ranked in many areas, elsewhere it is well below the average
for countries of similar per capita income levels. There is clearly room
for upgrading Chile’s institutions, and doing so could generate a new
productivity boom.
Section 2 develops a basic model along these lines, showing how
TFP can surge when institutions are upgraded. In section 3, we run
cross-section growth regressions with TFP as the dependent variable.
We construct several indicators of efficiency in institutions and exam-
ine their effect on growth, and we consider the potential effect on TFP
in a country like Chile. The final section presents our conclusions.
1. TFP, ADDITIONAL REFORMS, AND MICROECONOMIC
EFFICIENCY IN CHILE: SOME STYLIZED FACTS
The central hypothesis of this paper is that Chile needs to upgrade
its institutions if it is to achieve another decade of high growth. Some
might argue that the country has already made all necessary reforms
and extracted all the benefits from them. This view implies that Chile
now has to get used to lower growth rates (say, 4 percent per year),
which are achievable provided the country maintains its current level
of institutions and pursues a prudent macroeconomic policy. There are
at least three problems with this argument. First, while it is true that
Chile’s institutions function remarkably well in many respects, this is
not the case across the board. There is significant room for improve-
ment in many areas, as documented below. A new wave of reforms is
therefore needed to modernize the country’s institutions and boost
economic growth. Second, periods of high economic growth in many
recent success stories have lasted longer than in Chile.4 The fact that
Chile enjoyed nearly a decade and a half of rapid economic growth in
the 1980s and early 1990s is certainly remarkable, but as mentioned
4. See, for instance, Maddison (2001).315 Productivity and Economic Growth: The Case of Chile
previously, several countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America have
enjoyed two, three, and even four decades of rapid GDP growth. More-
over, Chile’s per capita GDP does not make it one of the leading econo-
mies in the world, so it should not exhibit a natural tendency toward
slower growth rates. Finally, rich countries are able to maintain rea-
sonable rates of productivity growth despite their high levels of per
capita income, which suggests that good economic policies and good
institutions are able to introduce some continuity in TFP growth.
Most international rankings rate Chile’s institutions as efficient in
an aggregate sense given the country’s per capita income.5 This does
not mean that those institutions cannot be improved, however, espe-
cially if growth has come to a relative standstill. Moreover, the same
rankings show that Chile has not progressed in recent years, but has
stayed more or less in the same place. Most of these indicators have to
be understood dynamically, in the sense that once a country has achieved
a specific place in the ranking, it can only hold that position by con-
tinuously raising the level of its policies and institutions. It is therefore
possible to register a slowdown in productivity growth even in the ab-
sence of absolute deterioration in the institutional quality.
One of the majors concerns in Chile in recent years has been the
efficiency of government spending and of the state bureaucracy. The
1990s saw a significant increase in government expenditure in the coun-
try, from 22 percent of GDP in 1990 to 26.4 percent by the end of the
decade. This raises the question of whether higher government spend-
ing has resulted in more and better government services.
1.1 Total Factor Productivity
Table 1 presents data on TFP growth for Chile over the last two
and a half decades. TFP is measured as the residual GDP growth that
is not explained by labor or capital accumulation. There are no input
quality adjustments. A productivity boom occurred in the second half
of the 1970s in the wake of the first wave of structural reforms; this
was followed by the crisis of the early 1980s. Recovery began in the
mid-1980s, when there was a second productivity boom (associated with
a second wave of reforms) that reached its peak in the first half of the
1990s. In the second half of that decade, productivity growth slowed
once more, and it was negative in 1998–2001.
5. See, for example, World Economic Forum (2001); O’Driscoll, Holmes, and
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These calculations clearly show that the key difference between
this latest period (1998–2001) and the previous fourteen years of high
economic growth (1984–1997) is TFP growth. As table 1 shows, capital’s
contribution to growth has been between 2.0 and 3.5 percentage points
since the mid-1980s (1986–2000) and has remained in the same range
in recent years. Labor’s contribution to growth, in turn, averages
1.5 points, but its share declined toward the end of the period owing to
a significant increase in unemployment since 1998. Finally, as men-
tioned above, TFP rose from two to three percentage points before fall-
ing back to a negative figure in 1998–2001.
1.2. Areas for Structural Reforms
We recently edited a collection of works that identify ten areas with
potential for improvement (Beyer and Vergara, 2001). If some reforms
were made in these areas, the authors claim, they would trigger a new
productivity boom and a new era of high economic growth. In what
follows of this section, we discuss the problems and proposals for change
in some of these areas.
Health reform
A recent study of the public health system by Rodríguez and Tokman
(2000) shows that the growth of government spending in public health
has not generated a corresponding increase in the services produced in
this sector. While government spending on health has risen by 190
percent, total services have increased by only 22 percent. This means
Table 1. Components of Economic Growth in Chile
Contribution to GDP growth (%)
Period GDP growth TFP Labor Capital
1976–1980 6.8 3.7 2.3 0.8
1981–1985 –0.1 –2.2 1.2 0.9
1986–1990 6.8 2.3 2.5 2.0
1991–1995 8.7 3.7 1.5 3.5
1996–2000 4.1 0.1 0.5 3.6
1998–2001 2.4 –0.6 0.1 2.8
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that the productivity of expenditure has fallen by over 50 percent. Beyer
(2001) calculates that if productivity were at its 1990 level, the public
health system today could provide additional services worth about 1.5
percent of GDP. On the other hand, there is also growing dissatisfac-
tion with the private health sector, which has not been able to cope
with the issue of catastrophic diseases. In addition, the number of people
in the private health system has declined over the last few years be-
cause of cost considerations.
Beyer (2001) suggests three basic principles for health reform. First,
the current system—in which everyone pays 7 percent of their income
for health insurance, such that those who earn more subsidize those
who earn less—should be transformed into a system in which people
pay the real cost of their health plan. Anyone who could not afford
minimum coverage would receive a government subsidy, and anyone
who wanted broader insurance would—as they do now—have to pay for
it. Second, the government subsidy should be portable. That is, people
should be able to choose their health insurance institution (ISAPRE),
and they could move with their subsidy to another institution when-
ever they wanted. ISAPREs would not be able to discriminate by health
risk. Third, independent councils should administer public hospitals.
The hospitals would not receive resources directly from the state, but
only indirectly through the subsidies that poor people receive.
These mechanisms are aimed at improving the productivity of the
private and public sectors. Beyer admits that is probably impossible to
reach the productivity levels of the early 1990s, because those levels
are overstated due to the declining resources of the public health sys-
tem at that time. However, a significant improvement in the current
efficiency levels is perfectly achievable.
Education reform
Human capital is one of the variables that attracts the most atten-
tion in the economic growth literature.6 Barro (1999) applies his cross-
section growth regressions to the Chilean case. He estimates that if the
quality of education in this country were at a level compatible with its
per capita income, growth would be as much as two percentage points
higher per year. Barro uses scores achieved in an international science
test to measure education quality.7 Education is one of the major forces
6. See Lucas (1988); Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995); Barro (1991).
7. See Barro and Lee (1997, 2000).318 Harald Beyer and Rodrigo Vergara
behind economic growth, yet international examination scores clearly
reveal that Chile performs well below its development level in terms of
education quality. This suggests that improving education quality could
significantly accelerate growth. We return to this point in section 3.
The education budget grew from 2.5 percent of GDP in 1990 to 4.2
percent of GDP in 2000, but the education system shows no clear signs
of any improvement in quality. While it is true that education is a
long-run issue, the emphasis seems to have been on throwing addi-
tional resources at the sector, rather than on how to actually improve
educational outcomes.8
Eyzaguirre and Fontaine (2001) propose setting explicit targets for
school achievement, with the use of external national tests to verify
whether the targets are being met. These authors emphasize the need
to improve the information that parents get about the quality of schools.
This would increase the pressure on schools to improve their quality.
These proposals are complemented with calls to increase the autonomy
of public schools, especially regarding the administration of human
resources (teachers). The current system of subsidies for children at-
tending public schools should remain in effect, but it should be made
progressive, with the poorest students getting a higher subsidy.9
Labor reform
As documented by Heckman and Pagés (2000), firing costs in Chile
are among the highest in Latin America. They estimate a significant ef-
fect of these costs on employment, especially on youth unemployment. The
present value of the expected cost of firing a worker is well above the
average for the region. The labor reform approved in 2001 exacerbates the
problem by moving in the direction of less, rather than more, flexibility.10
Other microeconomic reforms
Several additional microeconomic reforms could increase produc-
tivity, and these aim largely at improving the efficiency of institutions.11
For instance, Paredes (2001) finds that the antitrust regulation and
8. See Eyzaguirre and Fontaine (2001).
9. The current system encompasses both municipal schools and private schools
with state subsidies.
10. For a proposal to increase the flexibility in the labor market in Chile, see
Coloma (2001).
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institutions in Chile are obsolete. They do not have a clear objective, and
the type of problems that they should address has not been clearly defined.
The author also claims that these institutions need greater autonomy
than they currently enjoy. The issue of antitrust is becoming increasingly
important because the Chilean industrial sector has followed the world
trend of growing concentration. Achieving the objective of an efficient market
economy requires professional and efficient institutions to safeguard the
preservation of competitive markets. The current system in Chile needs
an upgrade to guarantee the achievement of this objective.
Irarrázaval (2001) finds that the government programs directed at
poverty reduction are similarly obsolete. They were designed in the
1980s, when more than 40 percent of the population was defined as
being poor. Poverty has since been reduced to about 20 percent of the
population, however, and, it is necessary to focus efforts on this smaller
group of people. If programs such as the family subsidy, the drinking
water subsidy, and the assistance pension program were focused on the
poorest 30 percent of the population, costs would be reduced by between
one-third and two-thirds, and the resources could be redirected to other
social programs. However, while focalization is necessary, it is also
very difficult to achieve.
Finally, regulation needs to be updated in several sectors, includ-
ing electricity, telecommunications, and banking. Environmental policy
and regulation are also on the list.12
1.3 Microeconomic Efficiency
Several different variables have been used in the literature to cap-
ture a country’s degree of microeconomic efficiency. In some of these
indices, Chile is well placed relative to other developing countries, al-
beit well behind developed countries. In others, however, it lags behind
countries at a similar level of development.
Djankov and others (2000) present data on the time and costs in-
volved in starting up a new firm. The process takes seventy-eight days
in Chile, ranking it fifty-fifth out of seventy-five countries—far behind
countries like Canada (two days), the United States (seven days), and
even South Africa (30 days). Chile performs worse on this measure than
most countries with a similar per capita income. In terms of monetary
costs (in relation to per capita GDP), Chile ranks twenty-fifth at 12 per-
cent of per capita GDP. This is good compared with, say, Israel (20 per-
12. For a specific proposal and analysis, see Beyer and Vergara (2001).320 Harald Beyer and Rodrigo Vergara
cent), but the level is much higher than in the United States or Canada
(1 percent), Australia and Norway (2 percent), and Turkey (3 percent).
The current competitiveness index published in the Global Com-
petitiveness Report (World Economic Forum, 2001) also provides infor-
mation on microeconomic efficiency. This aggregate index is intended
to capture an economy’s effective utilization of its current stock of re-
sources. The index is constructed from several variables, such as the
number of permits needed and days taken to start up a new firm, bu-
reaucratic red tape, and so forth. In terms of days taken to start up a
new firm, Chile has more or less the same position as in the previous
index (fifty-fourth out of seventy-five countries). In terms of permits,
Chile ranks thirty-fifth with five permits, which is more than the United
Kingdom (two), New Zealand (three) or the United States (four), but
less than Brazil (seven) or Mexico (ten).
Evans and Rauch (1999) study the effects of state bureaucracy on
growth, considering in particular salary structure and policy, along with
the procedures used for hiring top managers in public administration.
They find that the more that public managers are hired on merit and the
more attractive their salaries, the higher is the economic growth of the
country concerned. Valdés (2001) uses the coefficients obtained by Evans
and Rauch and finds that if the quality of Chile’s public administration
had been equal to that of Hong Kong in 1970–90, its growth rate would
have been as much as 1.5 percentage points higher per year.
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) construct a database
with a number of variables on governance, including the regulatory
framework. Here, Chile ranks eighteenth out of 145 countries, which
puts it above most other countries of similar per capita income, but
well behind countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom,
and New Zealand. Corruption is a variable that undermines the proper
functioning of institutions. These authors also construct an index of
corruption control, in which Chile is again well ranked (twenty-fourth
out of 136), but still far behind the leaders. The index ranges from +2.5
(less corrupted) to –2.5 (more corrupted). Chile scores 1.03, which is
well above the mean but behind countries such as New Zealand (2.1),
Canada (2.1), and the United States (1.4).
2. SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
We focus our analysis mainly on the growth of total factor produc-
tivity. Early growth studies generally start by considering an aggre-
gate Cobb-Douglas production function with technological change, so321 Productivity and Economic Growth: The Case of Chile
that growth in output can be expressed as a function of capital accu-
mulation and labor accumulation. Under the assumption of perfect com-
petition, the weights of the inputs are their respective shares. These
studies find that the unexplained part of output growth, the residual or
total factor productivity (TFP), is the most important element in ex-
plaining the growth rate of different countries. For example, Solow
(1957) finds that TFP explains 52 percent of the growth rate of the
United States between 1909 and 1949. Denison (1967) estimates that
for the period 1950–62, TFP explains 40 percent of the U.S. growth
rate, while it contributes 62 percent, on average, in a group of Euro-
pean countries. These high rates of TFP growth immediately triggered
debate in the profession. Some researches, such as Jorgenson and
Griliches (1971), pointed out that these early studies fail to recognize
the heterogeneity of the different inputs. New estimates of TFP were
calculated, with inputs categorized by type so that the growth of capi-
tal and labor became a weighted average of the growth of the different
input types. The weights were the income shares of the different types
of labor and capital in total labor and capital compensation, respec-
tively. This procedure thus corrected for marginal productivity of the
different input types. Using this corrected methodology, Jorgenson (1995)
finds that TFP accounts for only 21.6 percent of the growth rate of the
United States in the period 1947–85. Capital accumulation is the most
important factor in explaining growth.
A second strand of the literature uses the evidence from these early
studies to argue that there is something wrong with the neoclassical
theory of growth. These economists argue that if the main source of
economic growth is left unexplained, then the profession has no satis-
factory theory of growth (see, for example, Romer, 1986). New models
of growth were developed to deal with this problem. This is the origin of
the endogenous growth literature. In Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988),
the basic idea is that individuals do not internalize the externalities
associated with the accumulation of knowledge. These so-called AK
models (in which K is broadly defined) have strong implications. For
instance, if differences in savings rates among countries or in popula-
tion growth result in permanent differences in economic growth rates,
the strong implication is no convergence in per capita income among
countries as predicted by the neoclassical theory of growth.
The constant marginal product of capital and the (conditional) di-
vergence in per capita income are not sustained empirically, however.
Although the empirical growth literature tends to support endogenous
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returns to capital.13 The failure of the AK models to adequately predict
these facts has led to a revision of these early endogenous models. The
augmented Solow model of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) more ad-
equately fits the data. The basic model is augmented to include human
capital. Their empirical results are consistent with decreasing returns
to capital and a slow convergence to the steady state. Moreover, the
model is able to reconcile large differences in output per capita once
differences in the savings rate and population growth are accounted
for, which is a clear improvement on the basic Solow model.
Although the augmented Solow model does a much better job of
fitting the actual data than either the basic model or the AK models, it
has an evident shortcoming. In the steady state, the growth rate of per
capita income is defined by the rate of technological change, which is
exogenously determined and therefore unexplained. An important
amount of effort has been put toward trying to understand the forces
behind the rate of technological progress. The most successful studies
in this line of research are those linked to the Schumpeterian tradition
of growth through creative destruction. In the basic model (see Aghion
and Howitt, 1992), succeeding vintages of intermediate goods embody
quality improvements that render their predecessor obsolete. These
quality improvements are a source of economic growth, but they are
the result of an uncertain research process leading to a stochastic growth.
The possibility of monopoly profits introduces incentives to hire labor for
research instead of hiring it for the manufacturing of the latest genera-
tion of intermediate goods. In the steady-state equilibrium, the division
of labor between research and manufacturing remains unchanged, al-
though growth is stochastic given the nature of research activities. The
average growth rate in this steady-state equilibrium depends on the pro-
pensity to save, the productivity of the research technology, and the de-
gree of market power enjoyed by a successful innovator.
Chile put in an impressive economic performance over the last fif-
teen years.14 Hence, identifying areas that have been important obstacles
to Chile’s economic growth is not an easy task. The recent slowdown is
largely the result of the world economic downturn, although, as we ar-
gued above, there are indications that Chile’s productivity slowdown is
independent of the current international scenario and may be the result
of institutions and policies that perform badly. If these institutions or
13. For a review of the empirical growth literature, see Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995).
14. Only fourteen countries had a larger rate of GDP growth than Chile in the
period 1980–2001. Bear in mind that GDP fell 15 percent in 1982.323 Productivity and Economic Growth: The Case of Chile
policies affect the accumulation of both human and physical capital, lead
to misspending of resources, or impede efficiency gains, they will be un-
able to promote growth. Most countries, in fact, rely on institutions and
policies that deprive their economies of the necessary fuel for starting
the growth process, rather than providing the right incentives for growth.
This is the only explanation for why so many countries have been unable
to achieve a more permanent process of economic growth. Institutions
and policies must therefore be measured against their ability to promote
growth.15 If they do not measure up, then they must be amended. In the
case of a conflict with another objective, the political process is respon-
sible for balancing the two objectives.
To model the impact of institutions and policies on growth, we ex-
pand the framework developed by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992).
The level of GDP is determined by
1
()()()()(), YtKtHtAtLt
-a-b ab = Øø ºß (1)
where K, H, and L represent physical capital, human capital, and basic
labor, respectively. As usual a is the partial elasticity of output with re-
spect to K, and b is the partial elasticity of output with respect to H. A(t)
is assumed to have two components: the level of economic efficiency, E(t),
which depends on the quality of economic policies and institutions, and
the level of technological progress, F(t). We further assume that E(t) can
be written as a log linear function of economic policies and institutions and
that F(t) grows at an exogenous rate of g(t)16. After making the usual




























15. We are not suggesting that every institution or policy has to be measured
against that benchmark, but rather are thinking of those institutions and policies
that are more directly or exclusively involved with the economic sphere.
16. This rate of technological growth could eventually be endogenized by
assuming, for example, that it is the result of intentional investment in research
and development (R&D) by profit-seeking firms. These firms invest in R&D to
capture monopoly rents associated with a product innovation.324 Harald Beyer and Rodrigo Vergara
where the variables Ii stand for the different policies of interest. Defining
k, h, and y as K / FL, H / FL, and Y / FL, respectively, we can write the
















Solving for the steady-state values of physical capital and human





























Note that the level of per capita income in the steady-state equilib-
rium is influenced by the quality of economic policies and institutions.17
This last specification is valid only if countries are in their steady state.
Since this is not the case, the dynamics have to be modeled explicitly. If
we consider the production function defined earlier and the equations
of motion for k and h, we can take a log-linear first-order Taylor ap-
proximation around ln k* and ln h* (that is, the steady-state values of







which shows that y converges to y* at a rate of (1 – a – b) · (n + g). This




17. We have dropped the time subscript from the variable associated with the
quality of economic policies and institutions, which indicates that we assume they
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which implies that y approaches y* exponentially. To find an expres-
sion for the growth of per capita income, we add ln y* – ln y(0) to both
sides, producing the following growth equation:
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )




where (1 – a – b) · (n + g) determines the speed of convergence and in-
dicates how rapidly an economy’s per capita output, y, approaches its
steady-state value, y*. The starting level of per capita income is given
by y(0). Having solved for ln y*, we can substitute the expression into
the previous equation to obtain the following equation.
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This function can be empirically tested. We are especially inter-
ested in the growth rate of total factor productivity, since it is a natural
framework for thinking about economic policies and institutions. The
contribution to economic growth of similar rates of accumulation in
physical capital or human capital accumulation will differ across coun-
tries if their economic policies and institutions also differ. The early
empirical studies of growth capture the effect of these variables in the
so-called residual. The researchers were aware that this residual was
the result of an omitted factor influencing the growth process, and they
knew that exogenous technological progress was a convenient way of
expressing the output growth resulting from factors unrelated to the
accumulation of inputs. For example, Denison (1967) breaks down the
residual obtained in his growth estimation into several components,
including advances in knowledge, improved allocation of resources, and
economies of scale. These concepts are fully integrated in the modern
endogenous growth models.326 Harald Beyer and Rodrigo Vergara
The lack of both formal models and adequate data to test them
were important factors behind the slow move toward an endogenous
theory of economic growth. In addition, the residual was widely per-
ceived as the outcome of several, equally important factors. As Harberger
(1990) puts it, the residual is best understood in terms of a reduction in
real costs. Almost anything fits in this definition.
Recent studies, however, build on the idea that TFP has been over-
estimated as a source of growth (for example, Young, 1995). In our
opinion, whether TFP calculations are large or small is not a relevant
issue for growth theory, unless there is a satisfactory theory of what
makes TFP large or small. Input accumulation is clearly important for
growth, and there are quite satisfactory theories on how input accumu-
lation occurs. Differences in growth stemming from differences in capi-
tal accumulation are easily understand by the profession. We have a
lot of insights into why investment rates differ across countries. We do
not have many insights, however, into why TFP rates differ across
countries. The argument that TFP increases with efficiency gains is
appalling. An example illustrates this idea well. Assume that a firm is
not fully utilizing its existing economies of scales. A rearrangement in
production (probably an increase at the plant level) should therefore
produce an advance in TFP, because the reduction in average costs
associated with a complete utilization of economies of scale makes room
for a possible increase of the rewards to the existing productive factor
without an increase in output prices. An increase in the payments to
productive factor represents an increase in value added and thus in
growth. Consequently, it becomes almost inevitable to think about eco-
nomic growth as a very decentralized process that occurs at the level of
individual firms. In such a scenario, the relevant policy questions are
related to the general question of how to facilitate this process of effi-
ciency gains to the individual firms.
But is TFP an important source of economic growth? Put differ-
ently, is economic growth affected by the quality of policies and insti-
tutions? To answer this question, we do a very simple exercise in
growth accounting for the period 1980–2000, in which we estimate
the unexplained rate of GDP growth after controlling for investment
and increases in employment. We used the IMF data from the Inter-
national Financial Statistics. We take the labor share in GDP to be
0.6. Assuming a stock of capital that is 2.5 times output and a depre-
ciation rate of 5 percent, this implies an average rate of return to
capital of 11 percent, a reasonable return for the entire physical capi-
tal stock. Since we do not have consistent data on employment for our327 Productivity and Economic Growth: The Case of Chile
sample, we use population data. TFP is the result of calculating the
following equation:
=-+d- ˆˆ (), tttL TFPYrIsL (10)
meaning that TFP is the result of subtracting from the GDP growth
rate net investment weighted by the gross rate of return to capital (d is
the depreciation rate) and the growth rate of labor weighted by labor’s
share in GDP.
TFP is undoubtedly an important explanation of growth. Figure 2
draws the relationship between TFP and the rate of economic growth for
the period 1980–2000. Two-thirds of the variance in growth rates is ex-
plained by variations in the rate of TFP growth. This is not to say that
factor accumulations do not play a role in explaining the differences in
economic growth among countries. Our calculations may exaggerate the
actual importance of TFP, since our estimations do not correct for hu-
man capital. It would be surprising, however, if the inclusion of human
capital significantly reduced the importance of TFP.18 Chile shows a
Figure 2. TFP and GDP Growth
18. Indeed, for a smaller sample and for the period 1970–1991, Beyer (1997)
corrects for human capital accumulation and finds that on average, TFP fell 0.48
percentage points, ranging from 0.04 to 1.01 percentage points.328 Harald Beyer and Rodrigo Vergara
very good rate of economic growth that is explained by an important
TFP growth rate. This reflects the impact of the many reforms that
transformed Chile from a very closed and overregulated economy in an
open and competitive one.19 Repeating these high TFP growth rates is
precisely the challenge for Chile, though as the figure shows this is not
an easy task. Many countries had TFP growth rates close to zero, and
some had negative rates.
Table 2 confirms the role that TFP plays in economic growth. We
were able to build TFP for 107 countries in the period 1980–2000. If we
take the ten-year average growth in TFP for each country, we have 214
periods for analysis. We then select the top and bottom 10 percent of
the periods in terms of economic performance and compare the impor-
tance of TFP in explaining the differences in the GDP growth rate.
The differences in GDP growth rates among countries is explained
almost exclusively by differences in the TFP growth rate, whereas fac-
tor accumulation plays a relatively modest role. That TFP is an impor-
tant source of economic growth for every country is confirmed if we
concentrate our results on specific groups of countries. We begin by
using the Penn World Tables to rank the 107 countries according to
the level of their per capita GDP in 1980 (the first year of our analysis)
(Heston and Summers, 1991). For the group of countries whose per
capita GDP is in the top quartile of the ranking, we select the
subquartiles with the highest and lowest periodic rates of economic
growth. The time spans are 1981–1990 and 1990–2000. The next step
is to compare the average economic growth rates across the two groups.
These calculations are presented in table 3, which also reports the re-
sults of the same exercise carried out for the countries in the bottom
quartile of the per capita GDP ranking.
19. See Larraín and Vergara (2000) for a description of these reforms.
Table 2. Sources of Growtha
Average growth rate (percent)
Output Factor Accumulation TFP
Top 10 % fastest growing countries 7.55 3.88 3.67
Bottom 10 % slowest growing countries –1.19 2.29 –3.48
Difference 8.74 1.59 7.15
a. Sample comprises 214 observations, based on two ten-year averages (1980–1990 and 1990–2000) for 107 countries.329 Productivity and Economic Growth: The Case of Chile
Growth rates differ substantially among similar countries from one
period to the other and from one country to the other. Differences in
capital accumulation do not provide a consistent explanation for these
significant variations. Rather, the important discrepancies in economic
growth rates have to be linked to the differences in the rate of TFP
growth. In both rich and poor countries, the rate of factor accumula-
tion is quite high in periods of low growth, and it is the TFP growth
rate that determines whether the period will be bad or good in terms of
economic growth. Because the table is built on ten-year averages, it is
not capturing cyclical downturns in the economy.
These very simple exercises demonstrate the importance that TFP
plays in the process of economic growth. Of course, the exercises may
contain flaws that we do not take into account (for example, that TFP
may be correlated with investment), but the general picture is still
valid: TFP and thus policies and institutions play a major role in the
process of economic growth. Any attempt to foster economic growth in
Chile must therefore look carefully at the performance of Chilean insti-
tutions and policies.
3. ECONOMIC GROWTH, POLICIES, AND INSTITUTIONS
The previous sections showed that growing countries exhibit posi-
tive rates of TFP growth and that factor accumulation does a poor job
in explaining differences in economic growth across countries. Hence,
Table 3. Sources of Growth among the Top and Bottom
Quartilesa
Average growth rate (percent)
Output Factor Accumulation TFP
Top quartile
Highest periodic growth rates 4.57 3.48 1.09
Lowest periodic growth rates 0.50 2.79 –2.29
Difference in mean 4.07 0.69 3.38
Bottom quartile
Highest periodic growth rates 6.22 3.10 3.12
Lowest periodic growth rates –0.21 2.08 –2.29
Difference in mean 6.43 1.02 5.41
a. Quartiles determined by ranking the 107 sample countries according to their 1980 levels of per capita GDP.
Each quartile is then divided into subquartiles based on growth rates in the periods 1981–1990 and 1990–2000.330 Harald Beyer and Rodrigo Vergara
if we want to explain growth, we have to explain TFP growth, which is
strongly linked to the quality of institutions and economic policies. Which
institutions and economic policies have the greatest impact on economic
growth? In the case of Chile, we must further identify the marginal
initiatives that will increase economic growth in an economy that al-
ready enjoys high growth. The candidates for increasing growth are
not as obvious here as in the case of an economy that is not growing.
The extensive research of the last two decades indicates very broadly
how to increase economic growth, but it is not conclusive on specific
policy recommendations. A large body of literature (for example, East-
erly, 1993; Krueger, 1990) points out that bad economic policies may
affect economic performance heavily. This is not the case in Chile: while
the country’s economic policies may show room for improvement, they
are generally sound and respond more or less to economic dictums. A
related literature targets the role of institutions in the process of eco-
nomic growth (for example, North, 1990). Modifying institutions is a
very hard task, and the impact of such efforts is less obvious than
other forms of policy actions. Here, however, there is more room for
improvement in Chile. As stated at the beginning of the paper, the
educational sector and the government bureaucracy are obvious tar-
gets for reform. Their impact on economic growth is indirect but highly
significant. An inefficient government bureaucracy, for example, may
permanently hinder efficiency gains. A reform that substantially im-
proves the efficiency of the state bureaucracy could generate an almost
continuous increase in the country’s economic efficiency if it results in
the entry of new economic activities. The same thing can be said of a
once-and-for-all improvement in the quality of education. Productivity
will increase as the new school graduates enter the labor force, and the
increases will continue until the old labor force is completely replaced.
This may occur even if the schooling level of the new workers is the
same as that of the workers leaving the labor force.
One of the problems associated with empirical work on this subject
is the lack of data on many of the economic policies and institutions in
which we are interested. In the last two decades, different organiza-
tions have systematically collected reliable data on the quality of eco-
nomic policies and institutions, but much of the data rely on subjective
measures of institutional quality. Another problem is that different
indicators tend to be highly correlated within each dataset. This is not
really surprising, since most high quality policies and institutions come
in a package. A country with a good regulatory framework probably
also has a highly qualified bureaucracy and low levels of corruption,331 Productivity and Economic Growth: The Case of Chile
while the reverse is true in the case of countries with a bad regulatory
framework. Moreover, good institutions may be the result—and not
the cause—of strong economic growth. Even so, there are good reasons
to treat institutions as exogenous. Growing evidence indicates that most
countries have had their institutions for a long time, and these have
changed only modestly across time. The same evidence further shows
that the institutions have affected economic performance.20
We take a somewhat loose empirical strategy in order to focus on
reforms that may have a long-run impact on economic growth in Chile.
Starting from a very basic empirical model, we look one by one at indi-
vidual policies and institutions that, if upgraded, may contribute to an
increase in the country’s growth rate. The objective is to have a mini-
mum check of the viability, in terms of economic growth, of the pro-
posed reforms. We run cross-section regressions for our sample of coun-
tries. Table 4 presents the results of the basic model. The results are
more or less in line with previous research on the subject. The larger
the level of initial per capita GDP, the lower the rate of growth in TFP.
Openness, educational level, and the depth of financial markets posi-
tively affect TFP growth.
20. On both aspects, see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
Table 4. Basic Model of TFP Growtha
Explanatory variable Coefficient Standard error t statistic Probability
Constant 0.123152 0.032756 3.759660 0.0003
DLogGDP –0.016339 0.004187 –3.902475 0.0002
Openness 0.015492 0.005549 2.792071 0.0066
TYR 15–80 0.002132 0.001064 2.004475 0.0486






Probability (F statistic) 0.000207
a. The dependent variable is the rate of growth of TFP for the period 1980–2000. The independent variable is the
log of GDP per capita in 1980 (DLogGDP, which controls for convergence; the data are from the Penn World
Tables), the degree of openness (Openness, from Sachs and Warner, 1995), total years of education of the popu-
lation fifteen years and over in 1980 (TYR 15–80, from Barro and Lee, 2000), and the average ratio of private
domestic credit over GDP for the entire period, in log form (LogPC/GDP, from the IMF’s Statistical Yearbook).
The regression method is ordinary least squares. The number of observations is 80.332 Harald Beyer and Rodrigo Vergara
Table 5 evaluates the impact of governance on economic growth.
The data are from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (1999). These
authors aggregate different measures of governance, originating from
various sources of information, into six robust indicators: voice and
accountability (VA) measures the extent to which citizens of a country
are able to participate in the selection of governments; political insta-
bility and violence (PIV) measures perceptions of the likelihood that
the government will be destabilized; government effectiveness (GE) cap-
tures the quality of government by combining perceptions of the qual-
ity of public services with the independence and competence of the civil
service, among other indicators; regulatory burden (RB) captures the
extent to which a country’s policies are market unfriendly, as well as
perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation; rule of law
(RL) includes several indicators that measure the extent to which agents
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society; and finally, graft
(CP) measures perceptions of corruption. The choice of units of gover-
nance ensures that the governance estimates have a mean of zero, a
standard deviation of one, and a range from around –2.5 to around 2.5.
Higher values correspond to better outcomes.
One of the problems with these indicators is that they cover the
years 1997–98. Some are less time invariant than others. For ex-
Table 5. The Impact of Governance on Economic Growtha
Explanatory variable Coefficient Standard error t statistic Probability
Constant 0.139951 0.034232 4.088356 0.0001
DLogGDP –0.018198 0.004432 –4.105978 0.0001
Openness 0.011162 0.005284 2.112337 0.0381
TYR 15–80 0.001323 0.001149 1.151013 0.2535
LogPC/GDP 0.004529 0.003324 1.362517 0.1773




Probability (F statistic) 0.000123
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999).
a. The dependent variable is the rate of growth of TFP for the period 1980–2000. The independent variable is the
log of GDP per capita in 1980 (DLogGDP, which controls for convergence; the data are from the Penn World
Tables), the degree of openness (Openness, from Sachs and Warner, 1995), total years of education of the popu-
lation fifteen years and over in 1980 (TYR 15–80, from Barro and Lee, 2000), the average ratio of private domestic
credit over GDP for the entire period, in log form (LogPC/GDP, from the IMF’s Statistical Yearbook), and an
index of governance (Governance; see text for description). The regression method is ordinary least squares. The
number of observations is 78.333 Productivity and Economic Growth: The Case of Chile
ample, political systems have changed substantially in some coun-
tries in the last two decades, which may affect substantially VA and
PIV. RL may also be influenced heavily by such changes. GE, CP,
and RB are probably less sensible to changes in political systems.
Since our dependent variable covers the period 1980–2000, these lat-
ter indicators are the best candidates for use in our regression. How-
ever, these measures are highly correlated with partial correlations
ranging from 0.68 to 0.93. We therefore include in the regression an
average of the three indexes as a measure of government efficiency.
This index has a mean of 0.11, a maximum value of 1.75, a mini-
mum of –2.09, and a standard deviation of 0.775. Chile ranks high
with a value of 1.031, suggesting that the Chilean government is
doing a relatively good job. The index proves to be highly signifi-
cant. Despite Chile’s good performance, a plausible objective is to
shorten by half the distance between the maximum value in the
ranking and Chile’s value. This would add about 0.4 percentage
points to Chile’s TFP growth.
An alternative measure of government effectiveness is provided
by the International Country Risk Guide, published by the PRS
Group. This guide evaluates the risks faced by business in countries
around the globe. It includes the IRIS dataset, which compiles coun-
try scores for six variables: corruption in government, rule of law,
bureaucratic quality, ethnic tensions, repudiation of contracts by
government, and risk of expropriation. We use the scores for bu-
reaucratic quality as a measure of government effectiveness. The
scores range from 1 (low quality) to 4 (high quality). Data are avail-
able for 1982–97, although only a few countries have data for the
entire period. For each country, we take the mode of the available
data. Table 6 shows the results of this exercise. This measure of
government effectiveness is positively correlated with TFP growth.
Increasing Chile’s current score of 3 to the highest level may in-
crease TFP growth by 0.8 percentage points. This result confirms
our previous finding and suggests that a state reform on economic
growth may have a significant impact.
Finally, we measure the potential impact of the quality of educa-
tion using data from Barro and Lee (2000). Specifically, we incorpo-
rate their data on achievements on international mathematics into
our basic empirical model. If no mathematics tests are available, we
use the country’s achievement on the science test. If neither test is
available, we use achievements in reading. We took the last observa-
tion available. In some cases, the only tests available were conducted334 Harald Beyer and Rodrigo Vergara
in the early 1970s. This should not introduce serious errors, however,
since educational institutions do not change rapidly. We upgrade the
Barro and Lee data with the results of the 1999 TIMSS and the
Laboratorio Latinoamericano de Educación. We convert the achieve-
ments in the latter test to the scale used in the TIMSS based on the
performances of Chile and Colombia, which participated in both. Fol-
lowing Barro and Lee, we recalibrated the different tests to a uniform
scale of 0 to 100. Table 7 presents the impact of our indicator of educa-
tional quality on the per capita income growth rate. This last vari-
able enters very strongly in the regression, suggesting that a good
education may increase TFP growth significantly. Since Chile is al-
most 11 percentage points below the average in the TIMSS, achieving
that average may increase TFP by almost 0.7 percentage point.
Chile has a lot to gain by improving its educational system. An
average achievement would put the country at the level of Thailand
and Lithuania, and below countries like Latvia, Malaysia, and Bul-
garia. None of these countries have a higher per capita GDP than
Chile at purchasing power parity (PPP) levels. Figure 3 shows the
Table 6. The Impact of Bureaucratic Quality on Economic
Growtha
Explanatory variable Coefficient Standard error t statistic Probability
Constant 0.115096 0.034068 3.378392 0.0012
DLogGDP -0.016723 0.004400 -3.801046 0.0003
Openness 0.009717 0.005714 1.700565 0.0934
TYR 15–80 0.000424 0.001194 0.354892 0.7237
LogPC/GDP 0.004157 0.003220 1.290733 0.2010






Probability (F statistic) 0.000024
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the the International Country Risk Guide.
a. The dependent variable is the rate of growth of TFP for the period 1980–2000. The independent variable is the
log of GDP per capita in 1980 (DLogGDP, which controls for convergence; the data are from the Penn World
Tables), the degree of openness (Openness, from Sachs and Warner, 1995), total years of education of the popu-
lation fifteen years and over in 1980 (TYR 15–80, from Barro and Lee, 2000), the average ratio of private domestic
credit over GDP for the entire period, in log form (LogPC/GDP, from the IMF’s Statistical Yearbook), and an
index of bureaucratic quality (BUREAQUAL; see text for description). The regression method is ordinary least
squares. The number of observations is 77.335 Productivity and Economic Growth: The Case of Chile
comparative performance of Chilean students in the TIMSS math-
ematics test. The results are plotted against the level of per capita
GDP (PPP-adjusted). Chile is well below its level of per capita GDP.
The challenge is clear.
One of the main factors behind the underachievement of Chilean
students is that schools are rarely held accountable for their perfor-
mance (Eyzaguirre and Fontaine, 2001). It is therefore urgent to re-
form educational institutions in order to ensure accountability among
schools. Although Chile finance its schools through a voucher, parents
currently do not exercise their choice to move their children to better
schools. Part of the problem is that the information on school perfor-
mance does not flow easily to parents. Results on school achievements
have only been available since 1995, and they are difficult to under-
stand. It is indispensable that parents be alerted to bad school perfor-
mance and that they be able to move their children to better schools.
A major problem in this respect is that in many counties parents
must choose among municipal schools that perform equally badly. In
such cases, parents should have the possibility of opting out through
Table 7. The Impact of Educational Quality on Economic
Growtha
Explanatory variable Coefficient Standard error t statistic Probability
Constant 0.087146 0.031603 2.757507 0.0083
DLogGDP –0.014769 0.003477 –4.247755 0.0001
Openness 0.014842 0.005947 2.495772 0.0161
TYR 15–80 0.000588 0.001017 0.578089 0.5660
LogPC/GDP –0.000596 0.002572 –0.231658 0.8178






Probability (F statistic) 0.000018
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the International Country Risk Guide.
a. The dependent variable is the rate of growth of TFP for the period 1980–2000. The independent variable is the
log of GDP per capita in 1980 (DLogGDP, which controls for convergence; the data are from the Penn World
Tables), the degree of openness (Openness, from Sachs and Warner, 1995), total years of education of the popu-
lation fifteen years and over in 1980 (TYR 15–80, from Barro and Lee, 2000), the average ratio of private domestic
credit over GDP for the entire period, in log form (LogPC/GDP, from the IMF’s Statistical Yearbook), and a
measure of educational quality (TIMSS100; see text for description). The regression method is ordinary least
squares. The number of observations is 53.Figure 3. Mathematics Scores (TIMSS) and per Capita GDP
Growth (PPP adjusted)
Figure 4. A Comparison of Chile and Malaysia: Achievement
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transport vouchers or through direct intervention in the management
of these schools. Introducing this last alternative would require reform-
ing the teachers’ labor statute, which protects teachers heavily with-
out assigning clear obligations. Under this statute, it is almost impos-
sible to fire teachers regardless of student performance. Comparing
Chile with Malaysia shows how far Chile is from achieving a good edu-
cational system (see figure 4 and table 8). Even Chile’s best students
from expensive schools are heavily outperformed by the Malaysian stu-
dents. If Chile fails to achieve high standards in education, maintain-
ing a rapid rate of economic growth will prove very difficult.
4. CONCLUSIONS
We have argued that the rate at which economies grow is con-
strained not only by their level of resources and technology, but also by
the structure of incentives embodied in their institutions and economic
policies. In particular, Chile’s economic success in recent years is asso-
ciated with the application of sensible economic policies and the exist-
ence of a sound institutional environment. If the country is able to
maintain and improve these policies and institutions, it will ensure an
additional period of high growth. The major gains in economic growth
for a country like Chile may come from an improvement in its educa-
tional system. Reasonable and reachable improvements may increase
Chile’s TFP growth rate by 0.7 percentage points. Further gains are
Table 8. Complementary Information on Chile and Malaysia
Variable Chile Malasia
Per capita GDP, in 1970 (at 1990 PPP prices) 5,293 2,079
Per capita GDP, in 1998 (at 1990 PPP prices) 9,757 7,100
Population 15 and over with no education, in 1970 (% population) 13.60 41.40
Gini coefficient 0.52 0.49
Ratio of income earned by fifth quintile over first quantile 13.50 12.00
Public expenditures in education  (% GDP, 1998) 4.20 4.00
Total expenditures (% GDP, 1998) 7.30 4.70
Population, 1998 (in millions) 14.79 20.93
Primary enrolment (% population) 96.40 100.00
Public expenditures per primary student (US$ PPP 1998) 1,764 1,123
Public expenditures per secondary student (US$ PPP 1998) 1,713 1,460
Source: Maddison (2001); Barro and Lee (2000); OECD (2001); UNESCO (2000).338 Harald Beyer and Rodrigo Vergara
possible if government efficiency is improved. Taking our results to-
gether, we conclude that modest changes in the country’s policies and
institutions may increase Chile’s rate of growth in 1.5 percent points.339 Productivity and Economic Growth: The Case of Chile
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